风险厌恶销售商促销下供应商的退货政策 本期目录 >>
Title: Supply chain return policies with a risk-averse retailer exerting promotional effort
作者 代建生
Author(s): Dai Jiansheng
摘要: 运用CVaR方法研究了供应商如何使用退货政策来协调风险厌恶的销售商实施促销努力以改进市场需求下的供应链。分别考察了销售商促销成本可证实和不可证实两种情形下供应商的退货政策,研究表明:当销售商的促销成本可证实时,基于成本分担的退货政策能够协调供应链;当销售商的促销成本不可证实时,基本数量折扣的退货政策能够协调供应链。特别地,对供应商而言,如果销售商的促销努力易于证实,那么基于成本分担的退货政策优于基于数量折扣的退货政策。最后通过算例讨论了两种退货政策在现实中的应用。
Abstract: In a supply chain comprised of a supplier and a retailer, both risk aversion and promotional effort of the retailer can impose an impact on the retailer’s ordering decision, and thus affect the policies of which the supplier makes use to coordinate the supply chain. This article investigates the issue on supply chain coordination via return policies when the retailer is risk averse and exerts promotional effort under the CVaR decision criterion. A model including two stages of game is constructed, and is solved out by backwards solving techniques. In the first place, it studies the retailer’s decision on ordering and promoting, given the supplier’s return policy. Taking the method similar with Chen et al (2009) and Caliskan-Demirag et al (2011), we characterize the first-order optimality conditions which the optimal decision on ordering and promotion of the retailer must satisfy. Next, it discusses the supplier’s return policies taking into account the best response of the retailer. Two different scenarios are discussed, respectively. In one case, the retailer’s promotional effort can be confirmed, and in the other case, the retailer’s promotional effort cannot be confirmed or may be confirmed prohibitively costly. In the former case, by introducing cost-sharing mechanism, i.e., the supplier sharing a portion of promotional cost of the retailer, the return policy can achieve channel coordination. In the latter case, the supplier can provide a profile of policies composed of the return policy and quantity discount mechanism, i.e., the more the retailer orders, the lower the wholesale price is set, to coordinate the supply chain. In particular, the quantity discount policy, which coordinates the supply chain with promotional effort on the assumption of risk-neutral, cannot achieve the channel coordination when the retailer is risk-averse. Furthermore, it investigates differences and connections between the return policy associated with cost-sharing mechanism and that mixed by quantity discount mechanism. The return policy associated with cost-sharing mechanism is superior, for the sake of the supplier, over the return policy mixed by quantity discount mechanism in the sense as follows: The former can achieve a larger profit than the latter does. A special case exists if and only if the retailer is risk neutral. In this situation, for any return policy associated with cost-sharing mechanism, there exists a return policy mixed by quantity discount mechanism equivalent to it in the sense that the two return policies can achieve the same profit distribution in the supply chain. Furthermore, a great difference exists in the coordination mechanism aspect of the two return policies. For the return policy associated with cost-sharing mechanism, cost-sharing mechanism is used to eliminate impact of the promotional effort of the retailer on channel coordination. On this basis, it can induce the retailer to order the optimal order quantity of the entire system by adjusting the parameters of the wholesale price and the repurchase price of the return policy. Accordingly, the supply chain coordination is achieved. For the return policy mixed by quantity discount mechanism, the supplier sets such a menu of wholesale prices that it not only makes the retailer’s order quantity realize the optimum, but also lets the benefit rooted from the retailer’s promotional effort be exclusively shared by the retailer. In the meantime the supplier designs the return price to eliminate the impact of the risk aversion of the retailer on the ordering decision, and thus it succeeds in coordinating the supply chain. At last, an example from Lining Corporation is provided to illustrate application of the two different categories of return policies in the real world. A special return policy is put forwarded to achieve the channel coordination in the two scenarios, respectively. What’s more, it is confirmed that the return policy, which can coordinate the risk-neutral supply chain, cannot coordinate the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer, whether or not the retailer’s promotional effort is confirmed.
关键词: 供应链协调;退货政策;促销努力;风险厌恶
Keywords: supply chain coordination; return policy; promotional effort; risk aversion
基金项目: 风险规避供应链促销下的契约协调研究;基于利润返回的拍卖市场主导型生鲜农产品供应链协调优化与相关机制设计;风险规避和促销效应双重因素影响下的契约协调研究
发表期数: 2018年 第1期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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