考虑买方“跳单”行为的房产中介定价策略 本期目录 >>
Title: Pricing Strategies of Real Estate Brokers with Jump-dealing Buyers
作者 王晨;龚朴
Author(s): WANG Chen; GONG Pu
摘要: 买方“跳单”现象普遍存在于我国房地产产权交易二级市场,但目前相关运营层面的理论研究比较缺乏,因此,本研究通过探究买方“跳单”行为中的决策过程,分析了房产中介的中介费定价策略,试图提供相应的决策指导。虽然买方“跳单”仍然可能为房产中介带来一定的违约金补偿,但研究结果表明,房产中介的定价一定不能造成所有买方“跳单”。另外,在“跳单”违约金较高或房价较高时,中介的定价应尽可能保证买方零“跳单”。而当销售成本较高时,房产中介的定价会比较极端,要么很高,要么很低。最后,从利润的角度看,“跳单”违约金越高,房产中介所能获得的利润越高。同时,房产中介选择房价较低,房屋售价差异较小的区域代理,所获利润更高。案例分析结果表明,市场上买方对房屋的支付意愿较低时,相对于目前中介普遍使用的中介费策略,基于买方“跳单”行为的定价策略更优。
Abstract: Jump-dealing is a common behavior in the secondary real estate market. It means that a buyer receives a real estate broker's free buyer-seller matching service but carries out a house transaction with the seller directly. The objective of this behavior is to avoid the real estate broker's service fees. Thus, in order to maximize profits, real estate brokers should take buyers' jump-dealing into consideration when pricing the commission. However, the relevant literature is rare. Therefore, to fill the research gap, optimal commission pricing strategies are analyzed in this paper for real estate brokers when jump-dealing behavior exists. The decision-making process of jump-dealing buyers is explored and how real estate brokers should set the commission to control the buyers' jump-dealing behavior under different market circumstances is analyzed. It's generally recognized that the jump-dealing behavior would cut real estate brokers' profits and real estate brokers thus should take great efforts to eliminate it. Should brokers set a commission to avoid jump-dealing's occurrence? This puzzle is shed light on in this paper. The decision interactions between real estate brokers and buyers can be modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the first stage, based on the principal of profit maximization, real estate brokers set the commission. In the second stage, according to the utility maximization, buyers choose the optimal strategy among not buying, jump-dealing and buying from the seller directly, and buying from real estate brokers. The analysis is carried out through backward induction. First, the buyers' decision in the second stage is considered. The decision of buyers is the result of the trade-off between the commission and the liquidated damages of jump-dealing. There is no jump-dealing buyers when the commission is low; buyers will partly or wholly jump dealing when facing a medium commission, which is determined by the target house price; all buyers will jump dealing if the commission is relatively high. Second, the real estate brokers' decision in the first stage is investigated. Based on the buyers' decision, there are three strategies for real estate brokers to choose from: no jump-dealing, partial jump-dealing, and all jump-dealing. It is demonstrated that all jump-dealing strategy is not optimal, although jump-dealing can possibly bring liquidated damages. When selling costs are large, real estate brokers should set either a high commission or a low commission. Numerical experiments are conducted to explore more managerial insights. The results show that the optimal commission increases with the liquidated damages, decreases with the house prices, and suffers a short decrease before a long increase with the increase of selling price heterogeneity. Real estate brokers should try the best to implement no jump-dealing strategy if liquidated damages or house prices are really high. Moreover, real estate brokers benefit more if liquidated damages are high. The agency area in which the house prices are low and the heterogeneity of selling prices is small can bring more profits. Finally, case analysis is used to compare the commission pricing strategy mentioned above and that used by brokers in reality. It shows that if the willingness-to-pay of buyers is low, the jump-dealing-based commission pricing strategy is better; otherwise, the two strategies make no difference. In summary, the analysis results characterize the real estate brokers' optimal pricing strategy of commission when taking the jump-dealing buyers into consideration. The findings in this paper offer some appropriate guidance for real estate brokers to respond to various external environments.
关键词: 房产中介;“跳单”行为;居间中保;定价策略
Keywords: Real Estate Brokers; Jump-Dealing Behavior; Intermediary; Pricing Strategy
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目
发表期数: 2018年 第1期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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