真实盈余管理的原因:一个前景理论的解释 本期目录 >>
Title: Reason of Real Earnings Management: an Explanation of Prospect Theory
作者 鲍学欣;曹国华;邢相春;王鹏
Author(s): BAO Xue-xin; CAO Guo-hua; Xing Xiang-chun; WANG Peng
摘要: 本文利用2007-2012年间839个样本组成的面板数据,依据行为金融学中的“前景理论”,在设定盈余管理双重阈值与市场阈值、盈余管理收益与风险(成本)的直线型关系与双对数型关系的基础上,实证检验了上市公司进行真实盈余管理的原因。研究发现,前景理论可以对中国上市公司真实盈余管理行为进行解释:在盈余管理盈利区间,收益与风险呈现出显著地正相关关系;在损失区间,收益与风险表现为显著地负相关关系;并且,收益区间的系数关系要平缓于损失区间。同时,本文研究还发现,上市公司利用真实盈余管理替代应计盈余管理的真实目的在于追逐更为稳定的盈余收益。
Abstract: Earnings management is defined as a kind of behavior that listed companies use accounting reports or real activities manipulate company's periodic reports, which are designed to mislead market investors to understand the company's performance deviation, and maximize the value of the company or the company's management. In recent years, with the increasing intensity of the external audit, it is more difficult for the listed companies manipulated accrued earnings management, and instead they turn to manipulate real earnings management. Only income is greater than the cost (risk) of real earnings management in this paper, and real earnings management will become management's preference. Even as a replacement for accrued surplus, it must gain more revenue in the alternative process. Therefore, the Prospect Theory was adopted to analyze the real purpose that listed companies manipulate real earnings management. The panel data of 839 samples during 2007-2012 were used for empirical analysis, based on the Prospect Theory in behavioral finance. In the paper, double threshold of earnings management and threshold of market, straight-type relationship of earnings management benefits and risks (cost) and the relationship of dual logarithm were set to test the reasons that listed companies manipulate real earnings management. The first part analyze why the listed companies manipulate real earnings management based on the Prospect Theory, and consider that the management will clarify the gains and losses that real earnings management brings to listed companies, as well as the relationship between benefit (losses) and the cost, gaining more revenue in the process of manipulating real earnings management. Meanwhile, it was analyzed that the replacement from accrued earnings management to real earnings management, thought that listed companies can obtain more interest by manipulating real earnings than that of accrued earnings. In the second part, a study design under the Prospect Theory approach is built which the corresponding regression model includes setting double threshold of earnings management and threshold of market, setting straight-type relationship of earnings management benefits and risks (cost) and the relationship of dual logarithm. Secondly, on the measurement basis of sales control, cost control and production control, designed the measurement model for real earnings management, as well as a measurement for accrued earnings management based on non-manipulative measurement for accrual revenue. In addition, introduce the data selection method and data sources. The third part is elaboration on empirical analysis results. Firstly, the statistical analysis shows that the listed companies using the real earnings management replace accrued earnings management during the sample period. Then, the empirical results show that the Prospect Theory can explain the management behavior of real earnings management of listed companies, that is, the benefits and risks are significantly in positive correlation in earnings management earnings range, significantly in negative correlation in the loss range, and the coefficient relationship of benefits interval is gentler than that of the loss interval. The paper also found that, although the accrued earnings management and real earnings management exhibit the same relationship of benefits and risks, the coefficient relationship of benefit interval is steep that of the loss interval, indicating that the real purpose of listed companies using real earnings management to replace accrued earnings management is to chase more stable surplus interest revenue. Finally, based on the findings presented, we believe that it should put more attention on real earnings management behavior of listed companies in behavioral finance perspective, for maintaining a continued focus on real earnings management.
关键词: 前景理论;真实盈余管理;应计盈余管理
Keywords: Prospect Theory; Real Earnings Management; Accrued Earnings Management
基金项目: 国家社会科学基金资助项目;中央高校基本科研业务费重大自主资助项目;中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目
发表期数: 2017年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
参考文献/References:

[1] 张祥建, 徐晋. 盈余管理的原因、动机及测定方法前沿研究综述[J]. 南开经济研究, 2006, (6): 123~141.

[2] Healy P M, Mahlen J M. A Review of the Earning Management Literature, and its Implications, for Standard Setting[J]. Accounting Horizons, 1999, 13(4): 365~383.

[3] Fan J P H, Wong T J. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2002, 33(3): 401~425.

[4] Levitt A. The numbers game[J]. The CPA Journal, 1998, 68(12): 14~19.

[5] Bruns W J, and Merchant, K. A. The Dangerous Morality of Managing Earnings[J]. Management Accounting, 1990, 49(2): 22~25.

[6] Schipper K. Commentary on Earnings Management[J]. Accounting Horizons, 1989, 3(3): 91~102.

[7] Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005, 40(3): 3~73.

[8] 蔡春, 朱荣, 谢柳芳. 真实盈余管理研究述评[J]. 经济学动态, 2011, (12): 125~130.

[9] 李江涛, 何苦. 上市公司以真实盈余管理逃避高质量审计监督的动机研究[J]. 审计研究, 2012, (5): 58~67.

[10] 王良成. 应计与真实盈余管理: 替代抑或互补[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2014, 35(3): 66~72.

[11] Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979, 47(2): 263~292.

[12] Burgstahler D, Dichive I. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1997, 24(1): 99~126.

[13] Degeorge F, Patel J, Zeckhauser R. Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds[J]. Journal of Business, 1999, 72(1): 1~33.

[14] 曾爱民, 傅元略, 陈高才. 我国上市公司盈余管理阈值研究——基于前景理论视角[J]. 当代财经, 2009, (10): 123~129.

[15] 林川, 曹国华. 中国商业银行盈余管理研究——一个前景理论视角的解释[J]. 金融论坛, 2012, (11): 17~22.

[16] Koonce L, and Mercer M. Using Psychology Theories in Archival Financial Accounting Research[J]. Journal of Accounting Literature, 2005, 24(5): 175~214.

[17] 兰艳泽, 刘贞. 行为经济学视角下的盈余管理动因分析[J]. 广东商学院学报, 2010, (4): 74~77.

[18] 卢太平, 张东旭. 融资需求、融资约束与盈余管理[J]. 会计研究, 2014, (1): 35~41.

[19] 刘菲. 审计质量与真实盈余管理关系的实证研究[J]. 现代商贸工业, 2012, (1): 170~171.

[20] 曹国华, 鲍学欣, 王鹏. 审计行为能够抑制真实盈余管理吗?[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2014, (1): 38~47.

[21] Barth M, Landsman W, Lang M. International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, 46(3): 467~498.

[22] Chen H, Chen J Z, Lobo G J, et al. Effects of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital: evidence from China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2011, 28(3): 892~925.

[23] 鲍学欣, 曹国华, 王鹏. 真实盈余管理与现金股利政策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 经济与管理研究, 2013, (2): 96~104.

[24] Fiegenbaum A. Prospect theory and the risk-return association: An empirical examination in 85 industries[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1990, 14(2): 187~203.

[25] Shen C H, Chih H L. Investor Protection, Prospect Theory, and Earnings Management: An International Comparison of the Banking Industry[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2005, 29(10): 2675~2697.

[26] Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2006, 42(3): 335~370.

[27] 李彬, 张俊瑞, 郭慧婷. 会计弹性与真实活动操控的盈余管理关系研究[J]. 管理评论, 2009, 21(6): 99~107.

[28] Dechow P M, Sloan R G, Sweeney A P. Detecting Earnings Management[J]. The Accounting Review, 1995, 70(2): 193~225.

[29] 陈武朝, 张泓. 盈余管理、审计师变更与审计师独立性[J]. 会计研究, 2004, (8): 81~89.

[30] 吴克平, 于富生, 黎来芳. 新会计准则影响中国上市公司的盈余管理吗?[J]. 上海经济研究, 2013, (8): 51~67.

[31] 刘旻, 蒋正华, 王建伟. 中国上市公司盈利管理与股票价格关系的实证研究[J]. 系统工程, 2005, 23(4): 39~43.