再制造下基于努力程度的产品租赁服务系统收益共享契约研究 本期目录 >>
Title: Effort-driven and Revenue sharing Contracts for Leased Product Service System Based on Remanufacturing
作者 刘宇熹;谢家平;葛夫财
Author(s): Liu Yuxi; Xie Jiaping; Ge Fucai
摘要: 21世纪,制造企业为了实现可持续发展,其产品价值与服务增值并重融合,后市场服务的作用越来越明显。本文针对一个由再制造企业和产品用户组成的产品租赁服务系统,租赁期间企业向用户提供包括产品维护升级、零部件更换以及对回收零部件和产品进行再制造等后市场服务,并依据服务内容收费及承担服务成本,用户在租赁期结束后返还产品。模型假设服务需求内生于博弈双方付出的努力程度,努力程度引致服务节约的同时,将产品回收再制造成本节约的价值(即环境效益)在系统内部进行分享,构建产品租赁服务系统收益共享契约优化模型,探讨努力程度、分享比例、博弈各方收益以及渠道总收益之间的作用机理。研究结果表明当服务价格小于两倍的服务成本且环境效益的分享对博弈双方努力程度激励存在上限时,环境效益共享契约可以使渠道总收益达到最优。在此条件下,再制造企业的收益也会随着其努力程度的提高而增加,但博弈一方的努力会随着另一方努力程度的增加而降低。此外,再制造企业的努力程度与服务成本正相关,而产品用户则相反。
Abstract: Remanufacture and product service system are the two effective ways for manufacturing enterprises to achieve enhanced competitiveness and sustainable development. The former makes dematerializations come true directly by an advanced form of materials’ closed loop, while the latter achieves that indirectly by the service offerings. While in the tide of industry upgrading and transformation, more and more manufacturing enterprises combine remanufacturing with product service systems, that is, using product service systems to cultivate faithful customer relationship and to provide used products or parts for remanufacturing, on the other hand, also using remanufactured products and parts to reduce their cost and save resources. The leased product service systems discussed here is just this type of business model. Although some achievements have been obtained these years, there are still several defects in the previous studies such as just only seeking the implementation of economic performance limited in remanufacturing enterprise itself or just considering the saving and reducing of indirect materials lacking the thought of integrating product and service under a product life-cycle perspective. To solve these problems, we propose that the business strategies of product service systems require closely interaction between remanufacturing enterprises and their users. The strategies’ economic and environmental goal will not be realized at the same time if we do not consider the efforts of enterprises and users. In this paper, we study a leased product service system which contains a remanufacturing enterprise and a product user to analyze the coordinating mechanism among them using the revenue sharing contracts considering player’s effort in the game. The relationships between player’s efforts and their revenue are discussed deeply. The first difference and creation of this paper comparing to previous ones is the assumption that service demand is the function of efforts made by the enterprises and users. The second one is the sharing of the value of taking-back used product before remanufactured to reflect the environment performance. We find that when the service price is smaller than twice of the service cost and the sharing of environment performance has limited incentive effect, environment performance sharing contracts can achieve coordination and the total channel profit is greater than without sharing. Also the efforts from each side are complementary about the reducing of service, they work with the opposite party and the improvement of one player’s efforts will make a better result of the other player’s efforts. Furthermore, a detailed numerical simulation finds that service demand and channel profit have the same trends and additional service will not decrease the channel profit. The sharing of environment performance is in inverse ratio to the efforts of product user, in direct ratio to the efforts of remanufacturing enterprise. In different level of cost the enterprises have the willingness to give corresponding efforts, but when they have no cost advantages the willingness of remanufacturing enterprise will be higher and so is the environmental value, while the willingness of user will be lower. In order to optimize the channel profit the sharing of environment performance must match the service price and then the interests of both sides can be met taking economic and environmental performance into consideration.
关键词: 再制造;努力程度;环境效益;产品租赁;收益共享
Keywords: remanufacturing; effort-driven; environment revenue; leased product; revenue sharing contracts
基金项目: 沪江基金人文社科项目“再制造下产品租售与后市场服务契约机制研究”;国家自然科学基金资助项目“基于物联网的闭环产品服务链契约优化及应用研究”;上海市一流学科基金;上海市哲学社会科学规划课题
发表期数: 2018年 第1期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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