基于微分博弈的军民融合协同创新体系技术共享行为研究 本期目录 >>
Title: Technology Sharing Behavior in Civil-military Integration Collaborative Innovation System Based on Differential Game
作者 赵黎明;孙健慧;张海波
Author(s): ZHAO Li-ming; SUN Jian-hui; ZHANG Hai-bo
摘要: 针对军民融合协同创新体系中军工企业和民用企业的技术共享问题,构建微分博弈模型,分别考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈三种情形下双方的最优策略、最优收益及体系整体收益情况。通过均衡结果的比较分析发现:①双方的技术共享努力程度随着技术共享成本系数、技术衰减系数的增大而降低,随着技术创新能力系数、边际收益系数、技术创新影响系数的增加而升高;②“补贴因子”作为一种激励机制,可提高民用企业最优技术共享努力水平、双方最优收益及体系整体收益,而军工企业的技术共享行为保持不变;③在协同合作博弈情形下,双方最优策略及体系最优收益均严格优于非合作情形。为进一步协调双方技术共享行为,求得了能够使军工企业和民用企业的个体收益达到Pareto最优的体系整体收益分配系数的取值范围。最后利用算例分析验证了理论推导的结论。
Abstract: In the era of globalization and information explosion, the worldwide new military reform and the rapid development of modern science and technology make the application of high and new technology in the defense department and civilian department fade in convergence. Currently, how to use the science and technology resource and promote the military and civilian technology sharing, as well as further realize the military-civilian integration collaborative innovation has become a major issue that need to be solved. Technology sharing is the critical path to the construction of civil-military integration collaborative innovation system. It makes a big difference to build a national science and technology innovation system, strengthen national military modernization and pull the economic and social rapid development. Existing studies have been undertaken primarily from the macroscopic and strategic perspective, while the research from the micro perspective, in terms of the military enterprise and civilian enterprise remains largely unexplored. Most of them aim to focus on specific problems by adopting qualitative analysis, rather than quantitative research with mathematical analysis. Therefore, this paper discusses the problem of technology sharing between a military enterprise and a civilian enterprise in the civil-military integration collaborative innovation system through differential game models. The conclusions obtained are expected to provide theoretical consideration for the military enterprise and civil enterprise to make decision on efforts for technology sharing, incentive problem, game structure, benefit distribution, contract design and other issues. For convenience of analysis, this paper focuses on the civil-military integration collaborative innovation system composed of a military enterprise and a civilian enterprise. In the first part, the related hypotheses and a general description of the following model are proposed. In the second part, the optimal strategies and optimal benefits of the military enterprise and civil enterprise, as well as the total benefit of civil-military integration collaborative innovation system are obtained in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperation game by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In the third part, relevant conclusions are drawn through the comparison and analysis from the equilibrium results. And on this basis, in order to coordinate technology sharing behaviors, the scope of benefit distribution coefficient is proposed to achieve Pareto optimality of individual benefit in the military enterprise and civil enterprise on the premise of system Pareto optimality. In the fourth part, a numerical analysis is utilized to verify the validity of the model and the correctness of the conclusions. Accordingly, the results show that: ①Effort level of bilateral technology sharing reduces with the increase of technology sharing cost coefficient and technology attenuation coefficient, but it rises with the increase of technological innovative ability coefficient, marginal benefit coefficient and technological innovation influence coefficient. ②Subsidy factor is a kind of incentive mechanism. It could improve the optimal strategy of the civilian enterprise, optimal benefits of the military enterprise and civil enterprise, as well as the total benefit of the system. The optimal strategy of the military enterprise remains the same. ③The optimal strategies and the optimal benefit of the system in the coordinated cooperation game is strictly superior to the non-cooperative cases. ④Through determining the scope of benefit distribution coefficient, the distribution mechanism is provided to achieve Pareto optimality of individual benefit in the case of the optimal total benefit of the system (coordinated cooperation game). Thus, such mechanism develops the coordination of technology sharing behaviors.
关键词: 微分博弈;军民融合;协同创新;技术共享;协调
Keywords: differential game; civil-military integration; collaborative innovation; technology sharing; coordination
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目;高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题;教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目
发表期数: 2017年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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