一种基于多属性双向拍卖的在线应用服务选择方法 本期目录 >>
Title: A Multi-attribute Double Auction Based Method for Selecting Online Application Services
作者 吴士亮;仲琴;张庆民;孙树垒
Author(s): WU Shi-liang; ZHONG Qin; ZHANG Qin-min; SUN Shu-lei
摘要: 针对客户在选择在线应用服务时面临搜寻成本高、决策效率低以及静态定价策略难以满足交易双方动态的价值沟通需要这一问题,本文提出一种基于多属性双向拍卖的在线应用服务选择方法。首先构建了一个由买方、卖方以及拍卖中介组成的双向拍卖系统模型,进而设计了拍卖机制,论证了该机制是事后有效的并满足个体理性及激励相容约束,最后通过仿真实验对该机制的可行性及应用效果进行检验。本文方法可降低在线应用服务市场中供需双方搜寻成本、提升匹配效率、有效支持供需双方实现价值共赢。
Abstract: As an innovative cloud computing based business model, software-as-a-service (SaaS) has proliferated since 21 century and there are signs that its market is quite promising. In SaaS, application software is deployed as hosted online services onto the IT infrastructures of SaaS vendors, who are in charge of the operation and maintenance of both application software and IT infrastructures. Customers subscribe the hosted services on demand, access over the Internet and pay SaaS vendors by the usage of subscribed service. During the subscription period, subscribers have the rights to use services that are usually upgraded automatically. For SaaS vendors, it is of great significance to quickly find customers and promote them to subscribe required services by offering effective pricing means. At this stage, SaaS vendors generally adopt the customer segmentation based static pricing method, and convey information of both application services and pricing policies to subscribers through their websites. Consequently, customer’s searching cost for application services is high, meanwhile, the communications over business values between vendors and customers are difficult to achieve dynamically and efficiently. Obviously, the selection of application services is time consuming and lack of market efficiency. To solve this problem, this paper employed market mechanism to study the selection of online application services. By considering both the characteristics of the SaaS model, including flexible combination of services, on demand subscription, online access, etc., and the flexibility and effectiveness of double auction mechanism in resource allocation, this paper proposed a multi-attribute double auction based method for selecting application services. By utilizing both price attributes and bid information from buyers and sellers, the proposed method realizes multiple matches between buyers and sellers during one round of auction, which effectively support the win-win over business values between buyers and sellers. In the first part, the price attributes, which should be considered during online application service selection, were firstly analyzed. On this basis, an auction system was proposed which included buyers, sellers and an auction intermediary. The intermediary is supposed to be responsible for providing Internet-based auction platform, publishing auction rules and related information. Buyers and sellers are required to register and submit bids respectively via the platform. The intermediary collects bids information, applies proposed auction mechanism to calculate hammer price and find the matched pairs of buyers and sellers. Second, the model for selecting application service was presented and the corresponding formal description was given. Finally, the auction mechanism was proposed, which was further proven to be ex post efficient and satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationale constraints. In the second part, a simulation experiment was conducted to test the feasibility and performance of the proposed method. Firstly, the auction algorithm was presented. Secondly, two sets of parameters, i.e., the transaction success rate and the average income were introduced. Thirdly, the different distribution scenarios for the combinations of seller's attribute related cost and buyer's attribute related value were selected to do the experiment. Finally, the experimental results were analyzed and the corresponding management implications were proposed. In summary, extant static pricing method cannot meet the needs of SaaS vendors’ effective pricing. To solve this problem, this paper proposed a multi-attribute double auction based method and given corresponding auction mechanism. The proposed method enables the automatic matching between buyers and sellers, improves matching efficiency and supports dynamic communications on business values.
关键词: 在线应用服务;软件即服务;双向拍卖;多属性
Keywords: Online application service; software as a service; double auction; multiple attributes
基金项目: 江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金;江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金;教育部人文社会科学基金
发表期数: 2018年 第2期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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