技术创新对集群双寡头Bertrand竞争均衡的影响分析 本期目录 >>
Title: Analysis of the Effect of Technological Innovation on the Equilibrium of Duopoly Bertrand Competition in the Clusters
作者 王凤莲;赵 骅
Author(s): Wang Fenglian; Zhao Hua
摘要: 基于Bertrand竞争,考虑技术溢出的距离衰减效应,引入技术创新参数,建立起集群内采用Naive 和GD策略的双寡头企业的价格动态博弈模型,分析了技术创新参数对博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明:采用GD策略企业的价格调整速度过大会使价格演化发生分叉和混沌;技术创新对均衡的稳定性具有重要的改善作用,即增加企业的创新产出可以增大均衡存在的稳定区域,减少价格博弈系统的分叉和混沌现象;技术创新下,间距较小的企业间的Bertrand竞争更易实现价格均衡。
Abstract: The stability of the price market is good for restraining inflation, maintaining market integrity and keeping the whole society stable. Maintaining the price market stable is one of the important goals of national macroeconomic policy for many countries. While the fluctuation of price market is the result of the price game and Bertrand competition is a simple simulation of price game, they are very important research problems, the stability analysis of Bertrand competitive equilibrium and the chaos control of its dynamic process. Enterprise cluster, as a special form of economic organization, plays an important role in the process of the social development. At present, it has become an important model of economic development in the world. Furthermore, enterprise cluster is characterized by geographical proximity and technological spillovers, which both can enhance the price game between enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to study the price market stability in the environment of enterprise cluster. In addition, the important role of technological innovation has been proved in many documents, but whether the technology innovation has the promotion effect to the stable price market has not been studied. This paper studied the effect of technological innovation on price stability under the environment of enterprise cluster. The paper is expected to find new ways to stabilize the stability of the price market, and provide a theoretical reference for the government to formulate the strategy to stabilize economic. Based on the Bertrand competition, considering the distance decay effect of technological spillover, introducing the technology innovation parameters, the paper first established the price dynamic game model of duopoly enterprises taking Naive and GD strategies in the cluster, and then analyzed the influence of technology innovation on the equilibrium stability applying chaos theory, specifically studied the effect of three variables on the stability of equilibrium points, which are the price adjustment speed, technology innovation achievement, and enterprise spacing. At last, numerical simulation was carried out. Aimed at enterprise cluster, the special organization form, this paper discussed the effect of technological innovation on the stability of market price and the mechanism of its influence. The research shows that, there is a price competition between double oligopoly enterprises, and dynamic price game strategies can lead to the chaos of the price market in enterprise cluster. But, technology innovation can improve the stability of the price game system. In particular, excessive price adjustment speed of the enterprises taking GD strategy will cause bifurcation and chaos of the price evolution. But it can enlarge the equilibrium stability region and reduce the bifurcation and chaos of the system to increase the technology innovation achievement. And under the technology innovation, Bertrand competition between enterprises with small space will more easily achieve equilibrium. The results of the study have important policy implications for how to stabilize the price market. The government can stabilize the price market by limiting the speed of enterprise's price adjustment appropriately, encouraging enterprises to carry out technological innovation, improving enterprises to gather and so on.
关键词: 企业集群;价格博弈;混沌;技术创新
Keywords: enterprise cluster; price game; chaos; echnology innovation
基金项目: AHSKY2016D14;1607a0202019;2015YQQ004;TSKJ2015B23;2016gjzd010
发表期数: 2018年 第1期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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