考虑网络外部性和渠道权力结构的供应链延保服务模式研究 本期目录 >>
Title: Analysis of Supply Chain Extended Warranty Modes under Network Externality and Different Channel Power
作者 易余胤;张永华;姚俊江
Author(s): YI Yu-yin; ZHANG Yong-hua; YAO Jun-jiang
摘要: 考虑网络外部性和渠道权力结构的影响,构建了两级延保服务供应链博弈模型,探讨供应链节点企业的最优延保服务模式。首先,根据现实中存在的四种延保服务模式,分别构建了相应的供应链延保服务决策模型。然后,通过对四个决策模型的均衡求解和对比分析,探讨供应链节点企业的最优延保服务模式,发现:1)无论消费者是否全部购买延保服务,四种模式下的延保服务售价、延保服务质量、商品销量、延保服务销量均与网络外部性强度正相关,商品零售价与网络外部性强度负相关,供应链节点企业利润及供应链系统总利润均与网络外部性强度正相关。2)无论消费者是否全部购买延保服务,网络外部性强弱以及制造商和零售商的延保服务成本水平高低,提供延保服务的一方在其主导的供应链系统中可以获取更高的收益。3)当部分消费者选购延保服务时,供应链主导方均有占优的延保服务模式,而从属方的最优延保模式需取决于网络外部性强度和双方延保服务成本水平的差异大小。4)当全部消费者都购买延保服务时,制造商和零售商的最优延保服务模式均取决于网络外部性强弱和双方延保服务成本水平的差异大小。5)当制造商和零售商面临相同的延保服务成本水平时,无论消费者是否全部购买延保服务和网络外部性强弱,主导企业选择由从属企业提供延保服务是最优的延保模式。最后,采用算例对所得到的结论进行了验证。
Abstract: Considering the impact of network externality and channel power structure, we constructed a two-level supply chain module with extended warranty(EW) service to explore the optimal extended warranty service business model for node enterprises and supply chain system. Firstly, we constructed the decision models according to the four extended warranty modes in reality. After that, we did the equilibrium solutions and comparative analysis of the four decision models to explore the optimal extended warranty service business model. The results show that: (1) the network externality makes a very important influence on enterprise decisions. The product order quantity, EW price, EW service quality, EW sales quantity, the profit of enterprises in the supply chain and the total profit of the supply chain system are positive correlations with network externality, while the product retail price is negatively related to the network externality. (2) No matter all consumers buy the extended warranty service and how strong is the network externality and how high is extended warranty service cost level of manufacturer or retailer, the one who is leading the supply chain system can get more benefits from it. (3) When only some consumers buy extended warranty service, the one who performs stronger will prefer to let the weaker one provide extended warranty service, while the optimal model for subordinate one depends on the strength of network externality and the difference of extended warranty service level. (4) When all consumers choose to buy extended warranty service, the optimal extended warranty service model for manufacturer and retailer both depend on the strength of network externality and the difference of extended warranty service level. (5) When manufacturer and retailer have same level of service cost, the subordinate one providing extended warranty is the best mode for node enterprises as well as supply chain system. Finally, some numerical simulations were provided to prove the conclusions.
关键词: 延保服务;网络外部性;博弈论;渠道权力;供应链
Keywords: extended warranty; network externality; game theory; channel power; supply chain
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金;广东省自然科学基金;12JNQM002
发表期数: 2018年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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