基于微分对策的低碳产品供应链营销合作协调机制 本期目录 >>
Title: Coordination Mechanism of Marketing Cooperation in Low-carbon Product Supply Chain Based on Differential Game
作者 赵黎明;孙健慧;张海波
Author(s): ZHAO Li-ming; SUN Jian-hui; ZHANG Hai-bo
摘要: 运用微分对策理论研究了单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级低碳产品供应链营销合作问题。在考虑低碳商誉对收益影响的基础上,分别考察了低碳产品制造商和零售商在Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg博弈与协同合作博弈三种情形下的最优营销策略,并比较分析了反馈均衡结果。研究结果表明,相对非合作模式,协同合作模式下的供应链整体收益和参与双方的营销策略最优。基于此,进一步讨论了参与双方个体收益帕累托最优条件下供应链整体收益分配系数的取值范围,给出了低碳产品供应链营销合作行为的协调机制。最后,通过算例分析验证了模型结论。
Abstract: It is a consensus of international society to reduce carbon emissions and promote the development of low carbon economy in order to face the challenges of climate change. The fulfillment of this aim depends not only on the low carbonization of production, but also on the low carbonization of consumption. The marketing strategy choice of enterprise is often greatly influenced by the consumers’ preference to the low-carbon products. Facing the unknown consumer preferences to low-carbon products, there is a great sense of marketing collaboration for manufacturers and retailers, thus the research on the marketing collaboration of low-carbon product supply chain has great realistic significance. Under the background of low-carbon economy, a certain amount of studies are made around the optimization problems for upstream of supply chain in terms of producing and operating, but rarely carried on from the perspective of low-carbon product marketing. On account of this, considering the impact of low-carbon goodwill on profit, this paper tries to explore the long-term marketing cooperation problem of the low-carbon product supply chain system consisted of a single manufacturer and a single retailer by using differential game. This study investigates the optimal marketing strategies of the manufacturer and retailer by adapting the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game, respectively. Subsequently, the equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. On this basis, this study further discusses the dynamic coordination mechanism of low-carbon product supply chain marketing cooperation, aiming to promote low-carbon consumption and reduce carbon emissions by optimizing the marketing decision mechanism. The first section proposes hypotheses and a general description of the following model. In the second section, considering the impact of low-carbon goodwill on profit, differential game models of the manufacturer and retailer are build respectively in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game. And each optimal equilibrium outcome is found by deducing the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In the third section, the equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. The results show that, the supply chain’s profit, the marketing efforts and profits of both parties involved in the coordinated game are superior to those in the non-cooperative game. The fourth section discusses the value range of distribution coefficient of supply chain’s total profit to achieve Pareto optimality of individual profits of the manufacturer and retailer, and thus the dynamic coordination mechanism of low-carbon product supply chain marketing cooperation is obtained. At last, the model is analyzed and confirmed through an example. To sum up, this paper expounds the value of long-term stable marketing cooperation for low-carbon product supply chain. On this basis, the dynamic coordination mechanism of supply chain marketing cooperation is discussed, and the value range of distribution coefficient of supply chain’s total profit is obtained. The paper provides a novel way for further researches.
关键词: 微分对策;低碳产品;供应链;协调机制;营销合作
Keywords: differential game; low-carbon product; supply chain; coordination mechanism; marketing cooperative
基金项目: 国家社会科学基金重大项目;国家软科学研究计划项目
发表期数: 2018年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:

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