创新驱动下竞争供应链的纵向整合决策 本期目录 >>
Title: Vertical integration of supply chain competition under the condition of R&D motivation
作者 李晓静;艾兴政;唐小我
Author(s): Li xiaojing; Ai xingzheng; Tang xiaowo
摘要: 基于竞争供应链市场,以供应商,制造商和零售商组成的三级供应链模型为基准,考察了创新驱动下三级供应链的纵向整合策略与两条链竞争对制造商利润的影响,并识别出每种整合策略选择的条件及其均衡特征。同时,从社会效益和消费者角度讨论了最优整合策略。研究发现:当一个制造商不进行整合时,另一个制造商对前向一体化的选择主要取决于两条链的竞争强度,对后向一体的选择严重依赖于创新投资成本系数。这显著不同于,两种整合策略的选择(即前向一体化和后向一体化)只依赖于创新投资成本系数。同时,制造商整合策略选择的动态过程不仅与创新投资成本系数相关,还受到两条链间竞争强度的影响,且两条链竞争程度不强时,若创新投资成本系数较小,则向后一体化策略为最终的占优均衡;若创新投资成本系数较大,则向前一体化策略为最终的占优均衡;若两条链竞争与创新投资成本系数都非常高时,分散化策略为最终的占优均衡策略。
Abstract: We investigate vertical integration two competing supply chains, each consisting of manufacturer, a supplier, and a retailer. The suppliers exert effort to reduce the cost by R&D motivation, and the retailers sell alternative products. Each manufacturer has one of the three strategies: no vertical integration, forward integration, or backward integration, We study the effect of vertical integration on cost, product price, and profitability and identical a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a competitive supply chain. We find that, when one of manufacturers is not vertically integrated, the other manufacturer’s forward integration depends on intensity of competition between the two chains mainly, and backward integration relies heavily on innovation investment cost coefficient. This is different from that, two kinds of integration choice (i.e., forward integration and backward integration) only depends on the innovation investment cost coefficient. At the same time, the dynamic process of manufacturers to integrate strategy is not only related with the innovation of investment cost coefficient, but also affected by the intensity of competition between the two chains. That is, when the intensity of competition is not strong, if innovation investment cost coefficient is low, backward integration strategy is the dominant equilibrium; if the innovation investment cost coefficient is high, forward integration strategy is the dominant equilibrium; when the two chain competition and innovation investment cost coefficient are both very high, diversification strategy as the dominant equilibrium at last.
关键词: 创新;竞争供应链 ;纵向整合;分散化结构
Keywords: Innovation; competitive supply chain; vertical integration; decentralized structure
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目; 国家自然科学基金青年科学资助项目;国家自然科学基金重点资助项目;四川省学术和技术带头人培养项目
发表期数: 2018年 第2期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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