股票期权激励、行权业绩条件与真实盈余管理 本期目录 >>
Title: Stock Option Incentive, Exercise Rights Vesting Performance Requirements and Real Earnings Management
作者 刘银国;孙慧倩;王 烨
Author(s): Liu Yinguo; Sun Huiqian; Wang Ye
摘要: 本文以2006到2012年期间实施行股权激励计划的中国A股上市公司为研究样本,对股权激励计划中行权业绩条件的设定与真实盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现,相对于“非激励性”股权激励计划的公司,“激励性”股权激励计划的公司实施真实盈余管理的程度更大;上市公司股权激励计划所设定的行权业绩条件相对于公司过去实际业绩水平越严格的,管理层实施真实盈余管理的程度越大;为了达到行权业绩条件,上市公司管理层会综合使用真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理。研究结果意味着,合理设定行权业绩条件对于股权激励有效性至关重要,过高或过低的行权业绩条件都难以实现股权激励的预期效果。
Abstract: Using the samples of listed companies in Chinese A share market which implemented equity incentive plans during the 2006-2012, this paper investigates the relationship between setting exercise rights vesting performance requirements in the equity incentive plan and real earnings management. This paper finds that: The degree of real earnings management which implemented by the company with a "incentive" equity incentive plan is greater than the one which implemented by the company with a "non-incentive" equity incentive plan. The higher the exercise rights vesting performance requirements compared to company's past actual performance level is, the greater the extent of real earnings management induced is. In order to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements, the listing corporation's managements will comprehensively use real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. The results show that, it is very important to set reasonable performance indicators level in the equity incentive plans, and too high or too low performance indicators level would make the equity incentive effect run counter to our desire.
关键词: 股票期权激励;可行权业绩条件;真实盈余管理;应计盈余管理
Keywords: Stock Option Incentive; Exercise Rights Vesting Performance Requirements; Real Earnings Management; Accrual-based Earnings Management
基金项目: 国有企业自由现金流量优化与控制机制研究;机会主义择时与股权激励有效性研究;国有企业多元治理逻辑、董事会行为合法性与企业可持续成长
发表期数: 2018年 第2期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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