数字内容平台收费模式对消费者行为的影响研究 本期目录 >>
Title: Effects of Digital Content Platform Charging Model on Consumer Behavior
作者 陈朋;熊励;杨璐
Author(s): CHEN Peng; XIONG LI; YANG Lu
摘要: 基于消费者主权理论视角,对数字内容平台不同收费模式下的消费者行为进行仿真研究。首先在分析数字产品定价重要性及与传统产品定价存在差异的基础上,对数字内容消费者日益增强的影响力和常见的平台收费模式进行了描述,然后基于个人理性约束和激励相容约束构造了数字内容消费者行为分析框架,最后运用计算机仿真技术分析了数字内容平台会员制收费模式、按交易量收费模式以及两者相结合时的消费者效用变化情况。研究结果表明:单一收费模式下,数字内容共享对消费者效用影响显著,特别是当平台提高会员费、数字内容价格或者缩短计算周期时,增加共享可以避免消费者效用水平大幅下降。混合收费模式下,无论是否允许共享,消费者均可以根据数字内容消费数量选择其中一种收费模式,与单一收费模式相比,混合收费模式更加符合消费者利益最大化原则。综上可得,混合收费模式优于单一收费模式,数字内容不能提供多元化收费模式时,共享能够有效维持消费者的消费意愿。
Abstract: Against the background where information and communication technology is being continuously innovated and applied, the digital content consumption has become an important force expanding the consumer demand, improving consumption structure and stabilizing the growth of economy. Although price theory has been fully studied, the essential differences of digital products in cost structure, competitiveness and abrasiveness have changed the pricing basis and supply-demand structure of the market, incapacitating traditional price theory to fully suit the digital content. The digital content consumers who are interconnected and interworked with each other have market influence and dominant right different from the past. Free choice and autonomous consumption has become the important symbol of modern market system. To compete for consumers has become the strategic core of the corporate development in the Internet era. According to consumer sovereignty theory, consumer behavior has been deemed to play a decisive part in commodity production. In most cases, however, it’s very difficult to converge the information of consumer behavior which, being a potential resource, fails to give full play to its value. With the rapid development and wide application of information technology, especially the emergence of platform-based e-commerce model, the information of consumer behavior can be effectively gathered and processed, and passive production can be changed to active production, thus promoting economic activities to return to consumption itself. During the evolution of digital content ecosystem, the platform-based companies have showed an exuberant vigor and powerful momentum, with consumers gradually controlling digital content industrial value chain. Currently, however, most of the researches are based on the perspective of the profit maximization of digital content platform, which are mainly reflected in the promotion of the platform user scale, cost allocation and the optimal charge strategy of profit maximization. This is distinctively different from the increasing market influence and dominant right of digital content consumers. Consequently, it has yet to be studied on the adjustment and improvement of charging mode of digital content platform to maximize the interest of consumers. Against this background , based on previous studies, taking the digital content platform as the subject and proceeded with individual rationality constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, we built a model of digital content consumer behavior according to expected utility theory, and analyzed the influence of the charging mode of digital content platform upon digital content consumer behavior from a theoretical point of view. The Matlab 7.9 has been uesed for the analysis of numerical example and simulation in order to examine the effectiveness of the model mentioned above. Compared with the general normative analysis or literal expression, this sort of simulation analysis is more transparent and accurate to summarize the model’s characteristics and distinctions. Through these efforts, we hope to provide theoretical basis and reference for digital content platforms to innovate their charging modes. The simulation analysis results show as follows: (1)digital content sharing is of critical importance to maintain the consumer utility in the single charging mode. It is the guarantee of the utility level of digital content consumers particularly when the digital content platform increases the membership fee or shortens the billing period; (2) regardless of whether the sharing is allowed or not, digital content consumers can choose what suits them best according to their consuming amount of digital content in multi-charging mode. Compared with single charging mode, multi-charging mode complies more with the principle of consumer interest maximization. In conclusion, the adjustment of the charging mode of digital content platform will exert a profound influence upon digital content consumer behavior. The consumer-centered, creative charging mode of multiple choices can further enhance the consuming willingness, thereby effectively promoting the digital content consumption.
关键词: 数字内容;双边市场;消费者行为;收费模式;平台
Keywords: digital content; two-sided markets; consumer behavior; charging mode; platform
基金项目: 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目;教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目
发表期数: 2018年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
参考文献/References:

[1] PricewaterhouseCoopers.Global entertainment and media outlook: 2014-2018[EL/OB].http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/global-entertainment-media-outlook/assets/china-summary.pdf,2014.

[2] 杨培芳.信息时代经济哲学与伦理的重建--中国经济向何处去的新思考[R].广州:中国信息经济学会学术年会,2013.

[3] Chang WL,Yuan ST.A Markov-based collaborative pricing system for information goods bundling[J].Expert Systems with Applications,2009,36(2):1660-1674.

[4] Jones R,Mendelson H.Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition[J].Management Science,2011,57(1):164-176.

[5] Shapiro C,Varian HR.Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy[M].Boston:Harvard Business Press,2013.

[6] 胥莉,陈宏民.具有网络外部性特征的企业定价策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2007,9(6):23-30.

[7] Bakos Y,Brynjolfsson E.Bundling information goods: Pricing, profits, and efficiency[J].Management Science,1999,45(12):1613-1630.

[8] Bhargava HK,Choudhary V.When Is Versioning Optimal for Information Goods?[J].Management Science,2008,54(5):1029-1035.

[9] 张宇,唐小我.信息产品垄断厂商定制策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(7):49-55.

[10] Goh KH,Bockstedt JC.The framing effects of multipart pricing on consumer purchasing behavior of customized information good bundles[J].Information Systems Research,2013,24(2):334-351.

[11] 周木生,张玉林.基于非线性边际支付意愿的信息产品定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):710-716.

[12] 刘志勇,李敏强,寇纪淞.网络外部性因素影响下信息产品版本化策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(7):13-26.

[13] Viswanathan S,Anandalingam G.Pricing strategies for information goods[J].Sadhana,2005,30(2-3):257-274.

[14] Huang KW,Sundararajan A.Pricing models for on-demand computing[J].http://archive.nyu.edu/fda/bitstream/2451/14748/1/CeDER-05-26.pdf,2005.

[15] Choudhary V.Use of pricing schemes for differentiating information goods[J].Information Systems Research,2010,21(1):78-92.

[16] Balasubramanian S,Bhattacharya S,Krishnan V.Pricing information goods: a strategic analysis of the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms[J].Management Science,2015,34(2):218-234.

[17] Berman S,Kesterson-Townes L.超越数字化-创造媒体与娱乐行业的未来[R].IBM商业价值研究院,http://www-935.ibm.com/services/multimedia/cn_zh_beyond_digital_cn_0165.pdf,2012.

[18] 埃森哲.中国消费者的数字化生存[EL/OB].http://www.accenture.com/cn-zh/Pages/insight-chinese-consumer-digital-life.aspx,2014.

[19] Dou Y,Liu T.Exploring the value of installed base: Pricing information goods under value depreciation and consumer social learning[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2013,22(3):362-382.

[20] Dewan R,Freimer M,Seidmann A.Organizing distribution channels for information goods on the Internet[J].Management Science,2000,46(4):483-495.

[21] Asvanund A,Clay K,Krishnan R,et al.An empirical analysis of network externalities in peer-to-peer music-sharing networks[J].Information Systems Research,2004,15(2):155-174.

[22] Chen Y,Xie J.Cross-market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty: Implications for competitive advantage[J].Marketing Science,2007,26(1):52-66.

[23] 软件与信息服务业研究所.平台经济研究[EB/OL].北京:工业和信息化部赛迪研究院,2012.

[24] 李泉,陈宏民.平台企业竞争有效性及投资策略性效果研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(4):27-30.

[25] Rochet JC,Tirole J.Two-sided markets: a progress report[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):645-667.

[26] 程贵孙.单边收费还是双边收费: 双边市场中媒体定价模式选择[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(1):203-208.

[27] 程贵孙.组内网络外部性对双边市场定价的影响分析[J].管理科学,2010,23(1):107-113.

[28] 徐晋,张祥建.平台经济学初探[J].中国工业经济,2006,(5):40-47.

[29] Rochet JC,Tirole J.Platform competition in two-sided markets[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2003,1(4):990-1029.

[30] 胥莉,陈宏民,潘小军.具有双边市场特征的产业中厂商定价策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(5):10-17.

[31] Bolt W,Tieman AF.Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26(5):1250-1255.

[32] Genakos C,Valletti T.Regulating prices in two-sided markets: The waterbed experience in mobile telephony[J].Telecommunications Policy,2012,36(5):360-368.

[33] Hagiu A.Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):720-737.

[34] 张凯,李向阳.部分重叠业务的双边平台企业竞争模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(6):961-970.

[35] Armstrong M.Competition in two-sided markets[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2006,37(3):668-691.

[36] 纪汉霖.用户部分多归属条件下的双边市场定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(1):75-83.

[37] 王强,陈宏民.声誉及网络外部性网上市场价格离散分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2010,44(12):1687-1692.

[38] 王强,陈宏民.平台收费对网上交易市场价格离散的影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(3):1-9.

[39] Parker GG,Van Alstyne MW.Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design[J].Management Science,2005,51(10):1494-1504.

[40] Feijóo C,Maghiros I,Abadie F,et al.Exploring a heterogeneous and fragmented digital ecosystem: Mobile content[J].Telematics and Informatics,2009,26(3):282-292.

[41] Caillaud B,Jullien B.Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(2):309-328.

[42] Rong K.Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics,2014,51:187-196.

[43] Kos N,Messner M.Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments[J].Economics Letters,2013,121(1):12-14.