规模经济的差异化竞争制造商集团采购的权力结构模型 本期目录 >>
Title: Power Structure Modeling for Group Purchasing with Differentiated Competing Manufacturers under Economies of Scale
作者 周茂森;但斌;周宇
Author(s): ZHOU Maosen; DAN Bin; ZHOU Yu
摘要: 针对由一个集团采购组织(GPO)和两个差异化竞争制造商组成的集团采购供应链,考虑GPO以批量折扣价格集中采购某种部件,并以转移价格提供给制造商,然后各制造商分别将其加工为一种差异化替代产品。分别构建了集中决策下的基准模型,以及分别由GPO和制造商主导的两种权力结构博弈模型,并得到唯一均衡解。进而分析了权力结构、产品差异化、规模经济性等因素对均衡结果的影响,最后从供应链视角提出了两种权力结构在不同环境下的适用性和演化路径,并用数值算例予以考察。研究发现:集中决策下的最优产量和系统利润均随规模经济性呈单峰变化,分散决策在规模经济性足够高时可达最优;制造商主导的系统利润在规模经济性较低时高于GPO主导,而在规模经济性较高且产品差异化较大时低于GPO主导;制造商主导时可能无法实施集团采购,并且,当产品差异化较小时,还可能对制造商不利,而对GPO和系统有利。
Abstract: With current market environment characterized by intense competition, much variability and diversified demand, more and more manufacturers have chosen variety and small batch production mode. In this context, group purchasing has been increasingly viewed as effective in saving cost and improving performance. Through group purchasing, manufacturers can realize economies of scale by aggregating their purchasing volume. However, during the decision process of group purchasing, inappropriate power structure will result in incentive misalignment and efficiency reduction. To address this problem, we study a group-purchasing supply chain that consists of one group purchasing organization(GPO) and two manufacturers competing in quantity. The GPO purchases a common component from vendors with a quantity discount cost, then provides the component for each manufacturer at a corresponding transfer price, and the manufacturers further process it to make imperfectly substitutable products. According to the power structure differences, and considering the environment factors such as product differentiation and economies of scale, three types of models are constructed in this paper, which are the centralized decision-making model and two Stackelberg game models dominated by the GPO and manufacturers respectively. By the solutions, we derive, for each manufacturer, the optimal quantity of the system, and the equilibrium quantity and transfer price under each power structure. On this basis, we analyze the effects of the environment factors on the equilibriums, and consequently compare the system profits under different power structures companied with numerical examples. Our study shows that both the optimal quantity and system profit are increasing in the product differentiation, but unimodal with respect to the economy of scale. The quantities under both power structures will not exceed the optimum, and can reach the optimum if the economy of scale is high enough. More interestingly, different from the GPO’s dominance, the quantity under the manufacturers’ dominance may be zero under certain conditions, that is, group purchasing may be failed. We also explore the sensitivities of the equilibrium decisions under different power structures. When the economy of scale is high enough, the quantities under both structures have the same sensitivity as the optimal quantity, but the transfer prices under different structures have opposite sensitivities to the product differentiation. Besides, when the economy of scale is relatively low, it has positive effects on the quantities under both structures, but it may has opposite effects on the transfer prices under different structures. Moreover, contrary to the GPO’s dominance, the effects of the product differentiation on the quantity and transfer price under the manufacturers’ dominance may be negative and positive, respectively. Finally, the applicability of each power structure is analyzed by comparison. We find that, if the economy of scale is high enough, both structures can realize system optimum. Besides, the system profit under the GPO’s dominance can be higher only if both the economy of scale and the product differentiation are relatively high, or if the economy of scale is relatively low and the product differentiation is moderate, otherwise, the system profit is higher under the manufacturers’ dominance. We also find that, when the manufacturers dominate, more power does not necessarily guarantee them higher profits, but benefits both the GPO and the supply chain, especially when both the economy of scale and the product differentiation are low enough. In summary, this paper studies the decisions and performances of group purchasing under different power structures by employing game theory. The findings in this paper can provide academic and practical insights for group purchasing.
关键词: 集团采购;权力结构;差异化竞争;规模经济;量折扣契约
Keywords: group purchasing; power structure; differentiated competition; economies of scale; quantity discount contracts
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目;国家科技支撑计划资助项目
发表期数: 2017年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:

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