基于不同用户信息水平的双边平台最优价格博弈时序研究 本期目录 >>
Title: Optimal Timing of Two-sided Platforms’ Pricing Games under Different Levels of Users’ Information
作者 邹佳;郭立宏
Author(s): Zou Jia; Guo Li-hong
摘要: 双边平台与市场两边的用户进行价格博弈时有三种可能的时序:同时与两边博弈、与其中一边先博弈或者与另一边先博弈。本文使用双边市场均衡模型的研究框架,在考虑用户信息水平和市场结构影响的基础上,对以上三种价格博弈时序下的均衡利润进行了比较。研究发现:给定交叉网络外部性为正,只要均衡存在、唯一且有效,在“垄断市场-用户完全信息”、“竞争瓶颈市场-用户缺乏信息”和“双寡头市场-用户缺乏信息”这三种情境下同时博弈都是最优的;在“垄断市场-用户缺乏信息”的情境下任意一种序贯博弈都优于同时博弈,但哪边先动的博弈时序是更优的则很难判断;在“竞争瓶颈市场-用户完全信息”和“双寡头市场-用户完全信息”这两种情境下,市场哪一边的差异化相对另一边越强,平台就越倾向于选择哪一边用户后动的博弈时序。
Abstract: Two-sided platforms need to complete pricing games with both sides for equilibriums, because users’ benefits in each side depend on quantity of users in the other side. There are three possible timings of two-sided platforms’ pricing games which are simultaneous playing game with two sides and playing game with any side before the other. Platforms can choose any one of them that influence the users’ decisions. Because the decisions of users’ in each side depend on their expectations of demand of the other side when platforms simultaneously play game with both sides, but the users’ in second-playing side can form their expectations by observing the real demand of first-playing side when platforms play game with any side before the other. The expectations of users depend on their information levels in any timing of pricing games. The users in each side can always keep their expectations of demand consistent with the real demand which is changed by the prices that they are charged if they are informed in simultaneous pricing games, namely, they form responsive expectations. On the contrary, the users in each side keep their expectations of demand fixed regardless of the prices if they are uninformed in simultaneous pricing games, namely, they form passive expectations. The users in second-playing side can always directly observe the real demand of first-playing side, but the users in first-playing side are likely to form different expectations based on their information level in any of sequential pricing games. The users in first-playing side form their expectations through observing the platforms’ prices of their side and hence predicting the optimal prices and users’ relevant responds of the other side if they are informed. On the contrary, the users in first-playing side form passive expectations due to lack of ability of prediction if they are uninformed. In conclusion, the timings can influence the users’ decisions and information levels can make the influence change, so we study the problem that which timing is optimal for profit at different information levels based on two-sided market equilibrium framework. We assume that there are two levels of users’ information which are informed level and uninformed level. We respectively compare the three kinds of equilibrium profits resulted by different timings with given information level in three market structures of monopoly, competitive bottlenecks and duopoly. Finally, we find following results: Firstly, simultaneous game is optimal if users are all informed and any of two sequential games is better than simultaneous game if users are all uninformed in monopoly market. Secondly, we turn to the market which is differentiated and competitive with fixed capacity in one side and monopolistic in the other side. The stronger differentiation of the competitive side is, more likely that the platforms play with the monopolistic side before the competitive side it is if users are all informed. In fact, it is most likely that playing game with monopolistic side firstly is optimal. It is optimal to play game with competitive side firstly only if the differentiation is very weak. On the contrary, simultaneous game is optimal if users are all uninformed. Thirdly, it is the market which is differentiated and competitive with fixed capacities in both sides. It is optimal to play game firstly with the side of which differentiation is weaker and cross-group network externalities are stronger than that of the other side if users are all informed. On the contrary, simultaneous game is optimal if users are all uninformed. Lastly, the results above all are based on the conditions that cross-group network externalities are positive and all of the equilibriums are existent, unique and valid. The later condition is satisfied if the cross-group network externalities are relatively weak.
关键词: 同时价格博弈;序贯价格博弈;完全信息;缺乏信息;利润
Keywords: simultaneous pricing game; sequential pricing game; informed users; uninformed users; profits
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金面上项目;教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目;陕西省社会科学基金
发表期数: 2017年 第3期
中图分类号: 文献标识码: 文章编号:
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